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RADICAL FREEDOM, RADICAL EVIL AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF ETERNAL DAMNATION
Mark Stephen Pestana

Thomas Talbott has recently argued that eternal damnation is incompatible
with the notion of a loving God. Part of his argument involves rejecting the
notion of self-willed damnation as being incoherent. In my paper I critique
this part of his argument by attempting to provide a ground in action theory
for the idea of willful separation from God. I elucidate this ground in tenus
of Duns Scotus' characterization of free agency and a distinction in the
intentional ordering of volition. I briefly elaborate the structure of moral evil
in terms of these notions. And finally I argue, using these concepts, that the
idea of eternal self-willed damnation is not incoherent, even if we consider
those blessed with the vision of God.

I.
In his excellent article on the doctrine of everlasting punishment, Thomas
Talbott argues that the doctrine of hell is incompatible with the doctrine of a
loving God. 1 His argument employs three conceptions of the nature of damnation, which he labels as "conservative," "hard-hearted" and "moderately
conservative" theism. The conservative position is that damnation consists in
the eternal rejection by God of sinners. The moderately conservative conception is that damnation is the eternal rejection by sinners of God. And the
hard-hearted view is that damnation is the fate of the non-elect (those created
persons who are simply not loved by God). He consecutively argues that each
of these conceptions ultimately involves a contradiction with the doctrine of
God as a loving being. I believe that his arguments work in the case of the
conservative and the hard-hearted conceptions of damnation. Therefore, I
focus my response on his arguments, which I find less compelling, against
the moderately conservative position.
According to Talbott, the problem involved in the moderately conservative
conception of damnation stems from the idea that,
Some persons will, despite God's best efforts to save them, finally reject Go.d
and separate themselves from God forever. 2

The difficulty which he claims arises from this notion is that of conceiving
of a possible motive for such a rejection of God. In an analysis that echoes
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John Hick's discussion of the same topic, Talbott points out that since the
choice to separate oneself from God must be free, it must be free from
ignorance of God, from deception about the consequences of the choice and
from bondage to sinful desires. 3 He then claims that because there is no
conceivable motive for such a choice, the idea that someone freely chooses
eternal damnation is deeply incoherent and cannot be admitted as possibly
occurring. 4
I find this argument less compelling than his case against the other two
conceptions because Talbott glosses over the conception of free agency which
grounds the possibility claimed in the moderately conservative position. In
this paper, I intend to defend the moderately conservative conception of
damnation by grounding it in Scotistic radical free agency.
In section II, I explicate Scotus' conception of free agency and introduce
a distinction between "first intention" volitions and "second intention" volitions. In section III, I apply Scotus' theory to the problem of moral evil and
attempt a construal of radical1y evil choice as involving the suspension of
first intention willing. In the final section I conclude that the idea of eternal
damnation is entirely coherent if radical1y evil choice is construed as having
as its second intention object the supremacy of one's own capacity for refraining from first intention volitions.

II.
Any notion of wickedness is logically dependent upon a theory of human
freedom and its limitations. To put the point roughly, the "more free" humans
are conceived of as being, the greater is the degree of their conceivable evil
doing. Duns Scotus championed a theory of action according to which ratio-

nal agents are capable of three species of free volition. The third will prove
crucial to the ultimate explication of evil and is best elucidated in contrast
to the other two. 5
The first way in which our will is freely exercised is easily understood if
we restrict consideration to purely mental acts, e.g., imagining or remembering. With regard to any mental content, however atomistical1y or inclusively
described, an individual can either attend to that content or not attend to that
content. To take a simple example, I am quite free to focus my attention on
the memory image of my father or not focus my attention on that image. If
I choose not to attend to such an object then some other intentional object
will "present" itself to my mind's eye for consideration. "Wherever" that next
object comes from, e.g., sensory stimulation or the workings of imagination,
it is again within my power to attend or not to attend to that object. In
scholastic terminology this is referred to as "freedom of specification," the
content of my consciousness being specified from among a field of possibilities by my exercise of choice. 6
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The second species of free willing can be best approached through a scholastic axiom. Since everything in the universe, though good since created by
God, suffers some degree of imperfection (since not identical to God), it follows
that every possible object of consciousness, other than God, possesses good
qualities and lacks other good qualities. Therefore any intentional object can be
attended to insofar as it is good or insofar as it is not good (Le., lacking in some
good). And an individual is free in precisely this sense; he can choose to attend
to an object under either aspect. This is known as freedom of contrariety, since
either aspect can be attended to or neither aspect attended to (Le., when some
other object altogether is attended toV Coupled with freedom of specification,
the free exercise of the will amounts to the capacity to attend or not to attend
to the good or not-good properties of whatever comes to one's attention.
For Scotus, if we have attended to an object as good then a tendency toward
further acts of will which realize or unite us with that object is elicited. If
the object is attended to insofar as it is not good then a tendency toward
further acts of will, which negate the object or separate us from it, is elicited.
It is of the nature of the will that if the object is attended to as good (or as
not good) then a disposition to exercise the will in a certain manner follows,
though we remain free to attend to the object under its other aspect or not to
attend to it at all (in which cases a different disposition would be elicited.).8
Scotus refers to this elicitation as "velIe natural iter. " It is our natural inclination to attain what is apprehended as good or shun what is apprehended as
lacking in good. The crucial term here is 'inclination' for this is only a
disposition to so will and is not willing activity proper. According to his
analysis, the will is not forced to elicit any act in line with its disposition to
activity.9 Active willing proper, Scotus refers to as "potentia libera" which is
the third species of free volition. It is the free operation whereby the disposition to will in a certain way (e.g., realizing a good) actually issues into
activity. In short, an individual may either freely realize what one is prompted
to realize ("velie") or freely abstain from realizing what one is prompted to
realize ("non velie-non nolle"). So too, an individual may freely either negate
what one is prompted to negate ("nolle") or abstain from negating what one
is prompted to negate ("non velie-non nolle"). As Scotus says,
In regard to any object, then, the will is able not to will or will it, and can
suspend itself from eliciting any act in particular with regard to this or that.
And this is something anyone can experience in himself when someone
proffers some good. Even if it is presented as something to be considered
and willed, one can tum away from it and not elicit any act in its regard .... 10
This capacity is referred to, in scholastic terminology, as "freedom of exercise" or "freedom of contradiction. "II It is important to note that if the will
is exercised in this way, the proffered good remains before the mind's eye
and as a consequence the disposition to realize in further acts of will the
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proffered good remains elicited (or "activated"). It is not the case that the
suspension from realizing a good thing occurs simply because the individual
has attended to the contrary evaluative aspect of the thing or has attended to
some entirely different object. Scotus further elaborates how this refraining
from willing, when the object remains before consciousness, is to be understood.
He conceives that the individual's attention shifts slightly or expands to
include her own act of will with regard to the object. In effect, though the
object is attended to as good, the individual concomitantly attends to her own
active willing (of that good) as not good. Accordingly, she suspends the
elicitation of any act of will with regard to that thing (and in spite of a
disposition to will the thing). To quote Scotus again, the will
could voluntarily not will that object and still have another volition, viz. one
that reflects on its own act, for instance, "I will not elicit an act as regards
that object."12

I will call acts of will which have as their object, further acts of will, "second
intention" volitions and acts of will which have as their objects, real as
opposed to intentional objects, "first intention" volitions. Examples of second
intention acts of will might include resolving to act in a certain way in the
future or deciding now to form an intention at a later date. 13
Now, according to Scotus' theory of action, it is conceptually necessary
that if a thing is attended to under its good characteristics and further first
intention will activity freely ensues then it is activity which is directed toward
the realization of the object. It would be conceptually impossible for volitional activity to ensue which is aimed at negating an object attended to as
good. Also, it is necessary that if will activity ensues when attending to a
thing as evil then it is activity aimed at separating oneself from or destroying
that object. Again it would be impossible to realize an object attended to
under the aspect of evil. 14 In any case, it is possible by freedom of exercise
that no first intention acts of wi\l (further than attending to the object under
an evaluative aspect) occur at all.
To sum up, we can regard Scotus' concept of the free exercise of the will
as a genus with three species. An individual first, is free to attend or not to
attend to any object of consciousness, second, is free to attend to an object
under its good aspect or under its not-good aspect and third, is free with
regard to the volitional disposition elicited by such a conception. If one has
attended to an object as good, one may choose to attend to that object no
longer, and it will vanish from awareness. If an object is attended to as good
(or lacking some good), but the will activity which is prompted by the evaluation is suspended, then one is to be regarded as exercising a second intention volition which has as its object the good of such suspension from willing.
The following example may help to clarify Scotus' notions.
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I know that the Dean has stolen money from department funds. When
appearing before the investigating board, I am asked if the Dean is the culprit.
In my awareness, I attend to the beneficial aspects of telling the truth (i.e., I
consider only the good qualities of answering 'yes, the Dean stole the
money') and am consequently disposed so to speak. Now, by Scotus' notion
of freedom of exercise, I have the option of saying nothing. In so refraining,
my attention shifts to include my own act of will with regard to the good of
telling the truth and I judge (perhaps) that it is good for me not to will in
accord with the inclination so to speak. Accordingly, I remain silent. If I do
speak then I will tell the truth since that is the good to which I attend. I could,
by freedom of specification, cease to attend to the good of telling the truth
and attend to something else altogether, in which case I might not speak or
might not speak the truth. However, in this case the object before my mind
has altered, i.e., I am no longer attending to the good of telling the truth.
Scotus' theory allows for inaction in the light of a clearly conceived good,
after which inaction the clearly conceived good remains before the mind
eliciting a disposition to actively will its realization. I will now attempt to
explicate moral evil in terms of Scotus' analysis of freedom and the distinction between first and second intention volitions.

III.
An individual who chooses wrongly is typically conceived of as doing something forbidden in order to achieve some apparent good. Scotus' theory of
action allows immoral acts to be conceptualized in precisely this way. When
someone chooses wrongly, one of two possible conditions obtains. Either an
individual's disposition to realize an apparent good freely issues into actual
activity even though she knows, in some sense, the object to be evil. Or an
individual's disposition to shun an apparent evil freely issues into actual
activity even though she knows, again in some sense, the object to be good.
In terms of the previous distinction between orders of volition, such wrong
choices are first intention willings. Scotus' theory of action also allows for
the conceptualization of second intention immoral acts. At this intentional
level, again, one of two possible conditions obtains. In the first case, an
individual conceives as good the free issuance into activity of her first intention volitive disposition (to realize a known good), which conception elicits,
in its turn, a disposition toward realization (second intention). The individual
chooses wrongly if her second intention disposition freely issues into will
activity proper. In this instance, the known first intention good is realized,
but only as a means to achieve another only apparent good (the object of the
second intention conception). In the second case, an individual conceives as
good the nonissuGnce into activity of her first intention volitive disposition
(to realize a known good) which conception elicits, in its turn, a disposition
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toward realization (second intention). The individual chooses wrongly if her
second intention disposition freely issues into will activity proper, which in
this case means that her first intention disposition is suspended.
Now, the extreme example of this last type of evil willing would be the fall
of the blessed from beatitude. Though Scotus admits to the utterly speculative
character of his suggestions, he does intimate that even if the object before
the mind is God, it is still possible for a radically free will not to affirm this
perfect good, i.e., not to "cleave" to God. 15 Within his conception there
always remains the possibility of inertia, apathy, indifference. A possible
second intention apparent good, realized in this radically evil inertia, is indicated by Descartes, in a remark he made on the nature of the will,
... it is always open to us to hold back from pursuing a clearly known good,
or from admitting a clearly perceived truth, provided we consider it a good
thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will by so doing. 16

Taking Descartes' suggestion then, I withhold in order to prove myself capable of so refusing! Note that in such an exercise of will, the object before my
mind is not merely the first intention object which elicits a tendency toward
activity. It has been appended by awareness of my own volitive tendencies
toward God. The supremely evil choice can then be conceived of as demurring the realization of the greatest known good (first intention) in order to
realize the apparent good of proving to myself that I am capable of so demurring (second intention). Now, in the light of this, let us look at Talbott's
claim that eternal damnation is an incoherent notion.

IV.
Talbott dismisses the idea that one would choose eternal misery for oneself
on the grounds that there could be no possible motive for such a choice (assuming one is not subject to ignorance, deception and bondage)P He is right that
there is no first intention good so realized, but it does not follow that the notion
is incoherent for it may be construed as the realization of a second intention
good. I behold God directly, which vision elicits a disposition to cleave to God.
Yet, I do not so cleave (first intention suspension) in order to realize the apparent
(second intention) good of proving I am capable of so abstaining.
If in a direct vision of God, I demur on this greatest of all possible goods
then what could God possibly do to save me? If he restricts my freedom to
prevent me from so demurring then he has in effect annihilated me as a being
capable of second intention volitions. If a being is free to choose God then
it is free not to choose God, even in the "face to face."IB That "not choosing"
is a separation and a damnation and if I demur on the splendor of God in
eternity then I damn myself in eternity.19
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